The broader quantum-security discussion now includes three separate pieces. QSB offers a specialized transaction method under current rules. SHRINCS provides a candidate signature scheme for protocol review.
BIP-361 proposes a process for moving funds away from quantum-vulnerable signatures. Its timetable depends on an approved post-quantum signature standard and output type. SHRINCS could supply one candidate for the signature component.
Developers would still need to define the output type, implement the code, review it, and secure network support. Only then could the proposed BIP-361 migration clock begin.
QSB sits outside that timetable because it uses a specialized path available today. Wider use would still require software that wallets, exchanges, and custodians can support consistently.
has identified one mined QSB transaction. Reproducing it requires project-specific tools, significant computation, and miner-direct access. The project has not yet published a standard-wallet workflow for creating and spending the protected output.