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    Home»Finance»SEC Provides Critical Group Formation Clarity Following Freshfields’ Trial Victory in Augenbaum
    Finance

    SEC Provides Critical Group Formation Clarity Following Freshfields’ Trial Victory in Augenbaum

    November 19, 202611 Mins Read


    On November 17, 2026, the SEC updated its Corporate Finance Interpretations (“CFIs”) on beneficial ownership reporting under 13(g) and 13(d).  Among the new CFIs is 101.07, which we are dubbing the “Augenbaum CFI.”  CFI 101.07 is the Commission’s first-ever “group” guidance on so-called “parallel transactions”—issuances such as registered direct transactions, private investments in public equity (“PIPEs”), and other offerings involving more than one investor. 

    The CFI comes on the heels of Augenbaum v. Anson Invs. Master Fund LP, No. 22-cv-249 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 11, 2022), the first Section 16(b) claim ever tried before a federal jury.  In Augenbaum, a serial plaintiff purchased ten shares of stock one year after the fact and sued eight investors in a solicited PIPE for nearly half a billion dollars.  Facing the threat of a novel trial before a lay jury, six of the eight defendants settled the claim for close to $100 million, before the jury ultimately exonerated the remaining two investors, including Freshfields’ client, Empery Asset Management. 

    In sum, CFI 101.07 clarifies that investors in a parallel equity issuance who jointly negotiate the terms of the transaction, including through a lead investor or with common counsel, and who independently agree to lock-up or participation agreements, do not form a group if their respective investment decisions and contractual rights are independent of one another.  The CFI provides critical comfort to both issuers and investors that should facilitate the free exchange of ideas in the negotiation of a parallel transaction without running the risk of inadvertently being deemed a Section 13(d) group.   

    1.  The March 2020 Financing 

    The Augenbaum case arose out of a March 2020 PIPE between Genius Brands International, Inc. (the “Company”) and eight different investors.  The transaction closed on the eve of the COVID lockdown, at a point in time when the Company was out of cash and on the brink of bankruptcy. Given its severe financial distress, investor interest in the financing was almost nonexistent.  The Company’s placement agent spent nearly two months selling the transaction to different investors before the order book was filled.  

    As is common in PIPEs and other parallel transactions, the initial transaction documents were negotiated between the Company, its counsel and placement agent, and a lead investor.  Drafts of those documents then went out to other potential investors.  Some had demands and comments, which they communicated to counsel for the lead investor.  Others did not.  None of the investors communicated with each other.  Each investor was represented by its own counsel. 

    The transaction documents contained several commonplace provisions for a distressed financing transaction.  The Company’s CEO agreed to an extended lock-up of his shares.  He and other shareholders also agreed to execute voting agreements in favor of the issuance, given Nasdaq rules required shareholder approval.  The investors also received standard consent and waiver rights and had blockers to prevent ownership in excess of the reporting thresholds.  All of the rights and obligations arising out of the transaction documents were several and not joint, meaning no terms of the agreement required any one investor to act together with any other.  Nor did the investors have a right of enforcement under the transaction documents against each other.   

    Shortly after the PIPE closed, COVID swept the world and an ensuing flood of liquidity hit the market.  The stock price of the Company, which produced entertainment for children who were now suddenly stuck at home, soared.  In compliance with SEC baby shelf rules, the Company took advantage of this opportunity by raising millions of dollars in several follow-on registered direct transactions.  Each of the investors was offered the right to participate in these registered direct transactions, and most did.   

    Ultimately, the investors exited at different times with significant, but independent, profits. 

    2.  Augenbaum’s Group Allegations and the Ensuing Disagreement Over the Group Pleading Standard by Judges in the Southern District 

    More than a year after the March 2020 PIPE, Todd Augenbaum, a serial securities plaintiff, purchased ten shares of the Company’s stock for under $20 and promptly sent the Company a demand letter.  He insisted that the Company pursue disgorgement of all profits from the investors in the March 2020 PIPE, on the basis that the investors had formed a group holding in excess of 10% of the Company’s stock.  The Company refused, and, as Section 16(b) permits, Augenbaum stepped into the Company’s shoes and sued. 

    Augenbaum pointed to the following allegations in support:

    • the investors’ purchase of securities under a single SPA;
    • the use of a lead investor to negotiate the transaction documents with the Company;
    • the CEO’s agreement to a lock-up of his shares, which Augenbaum characterized as being done for the collective benefit of the investors;
    • the Company’s representation that it would obtain voting agreements from certain principal shareholders to approve the transaction (as required by the Nasdaq rules); 
    • the investors’ rights to require the Company to enforce the voting and lock-up agreements, which Augenbaum claimed made the investors third-party beneficiaries of those agreements;
    • the inclusion of waiver and consent rights for each of the investors;
    • the follow-on participation by each of the investors in subsequent registered direct offerings after the March PIPE; and
    • the agreement by each of the investors to separate, stand-alone leak-out agreements with the Company in exchange for registration of the shares underlying the investors’ securities.

    The case was originally dismissed at the pleading stage.  The Court held in a 39-page opinion that “parallel investments made pursuant to a typical securities purchase agreement, along with the involvement of a single lead investor are not sufficient to raise a plausible inference that a group was formed.”  It noted that “Augenbaum seems to want the Court to read between the lines to infer that a group exists, but the gaps between the lines are so wide that without even a single thread connecting them, the Court cannot find that Augenbaum has plausibly pleaded the existence of a ‘group.’” 

    After the presiding judge took senior status, the case was assigned to a different judge.  The Court disagreed with the prior dismissal and allowed Augenbaum’s amended complaint to proceed.  It explained that “while the mere fact that the defendants signed onto a single purchase agreement or appointed a lead investor might not be enough to plausibly allege a group, those facts are among several allegations that, when viewed in Augenbaum’s favor, paint a picture of a coordinated strategy to acquire and then dispose of [Company] stock for a profit.” 

    The Court then denied summary judgment because (i) each of the investors had communicated with the Company’s placement agent in negotiating the transaction; (ii) there was evidence that two of the eight investors called the Company’s placement agent together on a single occasion; and (iii) counsel for the investors exchanged drafts of the deal documents with counsel for the lead investor.  The Court observed that “Augenbaum’s argument is straightforward: Through these transactions, defendants accumulated millions of shares of [the Company’s] stock on the cheap, and then when the price skyrocketed, they sold those shares, while ensuring that other shareholders couldn’t do the same.”

    3.  Defining a “Group” in a Parallel Transaction

    The SEC defines a “group” under Rule 13d-5(b)(1)(i) as two or more persons who “agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of equity securities of an issuer.”  A “group” typically involves shareholders coordinating in the purchase or voting of shares to achieve a corporate purpose, whether that be control or some other change.  A group does not typically involve shareholders who are solicited by a company to acquire the company’s securities in a negotiated transaction. 

    Therein lies the confusion.  A group is two or more persons who agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring (or holding, voting or selling) securities of an issuer.  A PIPE involves shareholders who acquire the same securities at the same time in the same transaction and on the same terms.  The difference is that the PIPE investors are not acting in any way to combine their beneficial ownership—a distinction the law does not yet adequately clarify.  Augenbaum converted this uncertainty into nearly $100 million in settlements in the week before and during trial. 

    4.  CFI 101.07 Clarifies That Routine Coordination in Parallel Transactions Does Not Form a Group 

    While the jury sided unanimously with Freshfields’ client in finding that Augenbaum failed to prove a group, that outcome does little to provide comfort to market participants in future parallel transactions.  Augenbaum therefore raised important questions about the risks of parallel transactions.  Are ordinary-course communications with a company’s placement agent and/or lead investor sufficient to subject investors to the risk of trial in every parallel transaction? Should investors avoid economic terms that could otherwise be central to a transaction, like lock-up or leak-out or voting agreements, based on the same trial risk from the Section 16(b) plaintiffs’ bar?  Can an investor engage in parallel transactions going forward without a substantially heightened risk of a demand and costly litigation from the Section 16(b) plaintiffs’ bar? 

    CFI 101.07 provides important clarity that should address many of these questions.  The Commission has made clear that communications between investors, the retention of joint counsel, and the negotiation of various transaction terms are not enough to form a group in parallel issuances, where, as in Augenbaum, investors make their own independent investment decisions and are not otherwise bound to any other investor. 

    CFI 101.07 addresses parallel equity transactions such as private placements, registered direct offerings, and equity or convertible note exchange offers, including deals that involve lock-ups or similar commitments to participate. The CFI includes key considerations for investors to avoid a “group” classification:

    • each investor independently determines whether to participate in such transaction based on its own independent investment objectives and circumstances; 
    • the investors communicate about the terms of the transaction among themselves and jointly negotiate the terms of the transaction with the issuer or the issuer’s agents (utilizing a lead investor and/or common legal counsel as their representative); 
    • the transaction agreement, and any lock-up agreement or similar participation commitment, among the issuer and the investors is executed by each investor in its individual capacity; and
    • the transaction agreement, and any lock-up agreement or participation commitment, does not provide any investor with any rights or remedies against any other investor with respect to the acquisition, holding, voting, or disposition of securities issued in the transaction, or otherwise contain provisions requiring the investors to act together with respect to the acquisition, holding, voting, or disposition of such securities.

    Notably, the Commission reminds investors that group questions are still “based on the particular facts and circumstances.”  Nonetheless, we believe that CFI 101.07 will be an important tool in the defense of future group claims.  Communications among investors in parallel transactions are commonplace.  Augenbaum proceeded to trial largely because each of the investors communicated with the Company’s placement agent.  That is quite clearly not enough in the eyes of the Commission. 

    The guidance has limits, however.  CFIs are staff views and do not bind courts.  But courts regularly look to SEC guidance in this area, so we expect CFI 101.07 to carry significant weight in future Section 16(b) cases built on ordinary financing activity.

    Key Takeaways

    • CFI 101.07 confirms that investors may participate in parallel transactions without a material risk of group formation.
    • Investors should make their own investment decisions independently, including whether and how much to invest, based on their own objectives and circumstances, and document that decision-making process.
    • Investors may discuss and negotiate deal terms, or appoint a lead investor or common counsel, without forming a group, so long as their investment decisions and their rights under the transaction documents are independent of one another.
    • The inclusion of lock-up, leak-out and other participation commitments should not result in group formation, provided that the rights and obligations flowing from such agreements are independent from each investor.  Investors should carefully review investment documentation to preserve that independent structure and avoid the creation of a consortium. 
    • Investors and issuers should keep agreements several and not joint, and avoid provisions that allow for sharing of rights or remedies among the investors or the direct enforcement of rights or remedies against other investors.
    • The guidance is limited to the circumstance of a parallel transaction. It does not apply to activist investors who seek to communicate about pooling their beneficial ownership for a corporate purpose, which would result in group formation.  
    • The guidance expressly leaves room to examine other understandings or concerted action, including action carried out through an intermediary.  Placement agents and lead investors should remain vigilant to avoid the appearance of group formation. 

       

    To receive the latest insights on US legal developments, subscribe to the Freshfields A Fresh Take Blog.



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